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Abstract
An important assumption in the statistical analysis of the financial market effects of
the central bank’s large scale asset purchase program is that the ‘long-term debt stock
variables were exogenous to term premia’. We test this assumption for a small open economy
in a currency union over the period 2000M3 to 2015M10, via the determinants of short-
term financing relative to long-term financing. Empirical estimations indicate that the
maturity composition of debt does not respond to the level of interest rate or to the term
structure. These findings suggest a lower adherence to the cost minimization mandate of
debt management. However, we find that volatility and relative market size respectively
decrease and increase short-term financing relative to long-term financing, while it decreases
with an increase in government indebtedness.




Recent studies analyzing the financial market effects of the central bank’s large scale asset
purchase programs assume that the supply of treasury debt securities are independent of the
term premia1 (see Eser and Schwaab (2012), Altavilla et al. (2014), Ghysels et al. (2014),
IThis document is a collaborative effort.
∗Principal corresponding author. Tel.: +34 666765006; Fax: +34 913942591.
1Term premia is defined as the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rate. Throughout
this paper, we consider term premia as the difference between the 10-year benchmark Portuguese sovereign
bond yield and EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average). EONIA is the effective overnight reference rate
for the euro. It is computed as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions in
the interbank market, undertaken in the European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
countries. For more detail, refer to European Money Market Institute.
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Fratzschser et al. (2014)),2 i.e. public debt managers are indifferent to the term premia and
do not change the maturity composition of government debt with rising or declining term
premia. As long as this assumption holds, i.e. public debt managers do not respond to the
term premia in a manner similar to private investors - by selling (buying) less long-term
debt when the term premia is high (low) - the estimates of the effect of Central Banks large
scale asset purchase programs on the term premia will be biased downward. This justifies
the view that the estimates are somewhat conservative (see Gagnon et al. (2011)).
However, what stops the debt managers from raising the maturity of government debt
when the term premia is low or is expected to be higher in the future? By issuing more long-
term debt securities, managers can lock in the current lower interest rates. Higher future
interest rates may also go hand in hand with higher rollover risk if the average debt maturity
is too short. Therefore, the legal mandate of cost minimization and risk considerations must
lead debt managers to raise the maturity today if they expect term premia to be higher and
market conditions more difficult in the future (see Chadha et al. (2013)).
Similarly, debt managers should reduce the maturity when the term premia is high
or is expected to be lower in the future. Shortening maturities today would reduce cost
immediately as the term premia is normally positive. At the same time, rollover risks
are smaller if debt managers hold the view that future term premia will be lower. These
considerations regarding the potential amplifying behavior of debt managers run counter
with comments made in the previously cited studies.
Therefore, to understand the debt issuance behavior, we empirically investigates the
evolution of sovereign debt maturity composition for the Portuguese economy. Our focus
here is the 2000M3-2015M10 period. We classify this period into three distinct phases. The
first phase 2000M3-2008M8 is considered as the pre-crisis period. This period preceding the
start of the global financial crisis improves the chance of identifying the supply effects of
treasury debt, which would otherwise be obfuscated by other factors.3
The second phase (2008M9-2011M3) was the period following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers till the period when Portugal officially declared loss of market access4 and decided
to join the Economic Adjustment Program. The rest of the period falls under the three-year
economic adjustment program that was signed in May 2011 by the Portuguese Government
and the European Commission on behalf of the troika.5
2For the US, see Gagnon et al. (2011), D’Amico and King (2010), Hamilton and Wu (2011), Stroebel
and Taylor (2012), Rosa (2012), Wright (2012); For the UK, see Joyce et al. (2011); For global market, see
Leduc and Glick (2012).
3The difficult financial market conditions prevailing in the post-crisis period, capital constraints on banks
and other financial firms, worries about the creditworthiness of sovereigns and wholesale market counter-
parties, and uncertainty about future regulations would all inhibit arbitrage by the private sector. Fiscal
support to financial and real sector by the government, loss of market access and direct ECB interventions
in the sovereign debt markets directly interferes with the actions of debt managers.
4For instance Afonso (2013) mentions ‘The unstoppable vicious circle of rising long-term government
bond yields and sovereign downgrades, that preceded the request for financial support in 2011.’
5Troika is the tripartite committee led by the European Commission with the European Central Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, that organized loans to the governments of Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and Cyprus.
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We address the following questions: (1) Is the supply of long-term treasury debt securities
independent of the term premia? In other words, are debt managers indifferent to movements
in sovereign bonds yields; and (2) What factors influence the debt managers behavior in
adjusting the maturity composition of government debt?
Our results suggest that the maturity composition of debt does not respond to the level
of interest rate or to the term premia. This finding give support to the recent claims that
the effect of large scale asset purchase program of sovereign debt securites are somewhat
conservative (see Gagnon et al. (2011), Eser and Schwaab (2012), Altavilla et al. (2014),
Ghysels et al. (2014), Fratzschser et al. (2014)). We also find that volatility and relative
market size respectively decrease and increase short-term financing relative to long-term
financing, while it decreases with an increase in government indebtedness - suggesting debt
managers adherence to the cost minimization mandate during calm periods. The significant
influence of relative debt market size and cross-border holding of public debt during calm as
well as crisis period suggest liquidity concerns as the major factor determining the evolution
of maturity composition over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the objectives and
evolution of public debt management in theory and practice. Section 3 provides an overview
of our country and time period selection. Section 4 builds hypothesis regarding the debt
managers’ behavior and provide some visual evidence. Section 5 investigates Portuguese
public debt managers behavior (i.e. maturity composition decisions) based on estimations
of reaction functions. Section 6 summarizes the results while Section 7 concludes with a few
policy recommendations.
2. Public debt management
Public debt management is defined as open market operations carried out in order to
change the composition of the outstanding stock of government-issued debt instruments.
The composition of public debt is usually characterized by the outstanding debt’s maturity
structure and public debt management is mainly concerned with changes in the maturity
structure. The distinction between the effects due to public debt management and the effects
due to fiscal policy is that the public debt management has to be self-financed. This means
that if the government purchases one type of government-issued bond it simultaneously has
to issue other types of bonds in order to finance the purchase without affecting the level of
government expenditure.
The early literature on public debt management evolved around the understanding of
key principles appropriate for the public debt management. Public debt was looked upon
as provider of utility to government and different maturity combinations were considered as
providing same utility at different costs. Minimization of the government’s interest costs was
considered the main objective as this rationale implies minimization of the taxes needed to
finance sovereign debt and hence minimization of the excess burden of taxation, contributing
also to efficiency gains (see notably Cohen (1955), Rolph (1957), and Afonso and Gaspar
(2007)).
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However public debt management as a tool for economic policy took shape when inquiries
by Musgrave (1959) and in particular Tobin (1963) showed that the government can also
affect the economic activity through public debt management, i.e., public debt management
could be used as an instrument in stabilization policy. Based on the relative substitutability
of money, government bonds and real capital in the public’s aggregate portfolio, govern-
ment’s choice of debt instrument can crowd-in or crowd-out private investment. To induce
private investment, government should reduce the supply of government issued bonds which
are close substitute to corporate equity and issue bonds that are distant substitutes. This
will increase the demand for corporate equity and hence lowers the firms’ costs of capital,
which increases (crowds-in) private investment.
In the same vein, Roley (1979), and Agell and Persson (1992), using the atemporal
capital asset pricing model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) showed that
the public debt managers can influence economic activity depending on the covariances of
the government-issued bonds’ returns with the returns on private capital. By changing the
supply of government-issued bonds with different covariances, the government can affect the
relative asset yields. The changes in relative asset yields affect the valuation of corporate
equity and hence the cost of capital, which in turn affects the investments. Accordingly,
public debt management was seen as an extension of monetary and/or fiscal policy and was
often in the hands of either fiscal or monetary authorities.6
However since the late 1980s, the institutional setting for public debt management has
undergone a strong transformation. During the 70’s and 80’s, most countries ran almost
permanent budget deficits and funded these deficits with new types of debt instruments,
deregulated financial markets or opted for direct debt monetization (by running huge in-
flation). This raised serious concerns regarding the debt sustainability, inflation and the
inherent trade-offs.7 The acknowledgment of this inherent conflicts of interest and increased
understanding that different policy objectives are best achieved by independent authorities
paved the way for independent public debt management and monetary policy authority.
However since the outbreak of the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt
crisis, the need for short run stimulation is pressing. Hence, when monetary policy is non-
accommodative, within limits debt management policy can take its place in augmenting the
potency of fiscal policy, or in improving the trade-off between short-run stimulation and
investment for long-run growth (see Tobin (1969), Friedman (1978)).
Empirical studies
6Other aspects of debt management have also been discussed in the literature. Chan (1983), for example,
discusses the conditions under which the composition of the outstanding public debt is irrelevant, i.e., when
public debt management is neutral. Gale (1990) discusses the welfare issues of public debt management, in
particular the impact of public debt management on the efficiency of risk sharing.
7 The argument goes that if the monetary authority is responsible for both monetary policy and public
debt management, it might be hesitant to raise interest rates to control inflationary pressures or be tempted
to lower interest rates in order to constrain debt servicing costs. This would obviously go at the expense of
the price stability objective, if, for instance, the central bank would also need to decide on the issuance of
Treasury Bills.
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There have also been a number of empirical studies of the effects of public debt manage-
ment, which provide mixed evidence on the effects of public debt management. Modigliani
and Sutch (1967) study the effects of Operation Twist, which was carried out in 1961 by
the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Operation Twist aimed at shortening the
average maturity of the outstanding public debt in order to raise the short-term interest
rates and lower the long-term interest rates. Modigliani and Sutch (1967) find no or weak
evidence of effects on the term structure of interest rates. Agell and Persson (1992) em-
pirically analyze the effects of public debt management on the financial markets using an
atemporal capital asset pricing model. They estimate the covariance matrix of asset yields
using US data and find that public debt management affects the relative asset yields. How-
ever, they find these effects too small to have any impact on the real economy. Friedman
(1992) uses US data and a general equilibrium framework where the financial markets are
modeled in essentially the same way as in Agell and Persson (1992). He finds that public
debt management has effects on the relative asset yields and on the real economy.
3. The case of Portugal
A priori, capturing debt management behavior in an econometric model does not seem
an easy task. When assessing the link between debt management behavior and term premia,
we face the issue of potential endogeneity. Furthermore, debt offices issue a wide array of
instruments, for example index linked or nominal bonds, with fixed or floating rates, and/or
denominated in national or foreign currency. Issuance decisions may reflect several demand
and supply factors, which may be potentially difficult to disentangle (see Hoogduin et al.
(2010)).
We therefore simplify our approach by selecting a small open economy, Portugal, within a
currency union and study debt managers’ behavior for a relatively calm period. This choice
rules out a few complexities and allows us to use more advanced specifications to understand
debt managers’ behavior.8 From the advent of euro, Portuguese debt management has
gone through very important changes. At the institutional level, a new public debt law
was approved for the creation of an autonomous debt agency and formal guidelines were
defined. A series of reforms took place that aimed to develop conditions for a more efficient
management of public debt in this new environment.
As part of the European Economic and Monetary Union, the Portuguese government
adopted the euro as its official currency and benefited from the credibility of a monetary
policy (though lost the option to monetize the debt) that is defined at the EU level. This
makes the Portuguese public debt management almost completely independent from the
monetary policy objectives which are set at the pan European level. Also the privileged
position as the reference issuer in the Portuguese escudo9 was lost and Portugal became a
8An important caveat as noted in Hoogduin et al. (2010) is that the estimations only capture issuance
policy, which is highly observable to the market. The estimations do not capture how debt managers
subsequently influence the maturity profiles of their debt through the use of financial derivatives, on which
data availability is rather limited.
9Escudo was the Portuguese currency prior to joining euro.
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small borrower in a large market, where it has to compete with other sovereign issuers (e.g.,
Austria, Greece) for the same investor base. Concerns with the liquidity of government debt
led the public debt managers towards progressive concentration of the financing activity into
the issuance of a restricted number of standard fixed rate euro denominated Treasury bonds
(OT). Commercial paper and savings certificates (a retail instrument sold to individuals)
has been phased out gradually though they still exist in the portfolio. Since joining the
euro, open market operations are extensively used to restructure the portfolio of existing
debt into larger and more liquid treasury debt issues.
3.1. Portuguese public debt management
Set up in December 1996, the Agência de Gestão da Tesouraria e da Dı́vida Pública
-IGCP is an autonomous institution responsible for the management of the Portuguese
central government debt and the execution of the central government borrowing program,
in accordance with the law and the guidelines defined by the government. The strategic
objectives explicitly state that public debt managers should aim to guarantee the financial
resources required for the execution of the state budget and be conducted in such a way as
to:
1. Minimize the direct and indirect cost of public debt on a long-term perspective;
2. Guarantee a balanced distribution of debt costs through the several annual budgets;
3. Prevent an excessive temporal concentration of redemptions;
4. Avoid excessive risks (namely refinancing risk and the debt volatility cost over time);
5. Promote an efficient and balanced functioning of financial markets.
As can be read, no explicit macroeconomic considerations or objectives are defined as
being part of the debt management. The idea was to make debt management very similar
to portfolio debt manager. However, the objectives left open the planning horizon of debt
management. This seemingly minor difference blurs the line where macroeconomic circum-
stances could outweigh cost considerations and can lead to considerable differences in the
practices of debt managers.
3.2. Fiscal position
Portugal got a good start in the run-up to the euro. The fiscal deficit improved from
above 5% of GDP in 1995 to just over 3% in 1999, the general government debt (as % of
GDP) dropped from 60% to just over 50% and the benchmark 10-year Portuguese sovereign
bond yield dropped from around 12% to less than 4%. These developments helped satisfy the
fiscal rules introduced in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
in the early and mid-1990s (Figure 1).
[Figure 1 about here.]
However it didn’t fully observe the fiscal discipline that EU members have to comply
with. After the euro had been introduced, the fiscal situation started deteriorating. The
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general government gross debt started showing a continuous upward trend (crossed the 1995
level by 2003 and stayed above) even when the cost of borrowing remained at its lowest
level. The government net borrowing requirement also reached the pre-euro 5-year average
level by 2005 and overshot both the general government gross debt and deficit targets by
the end of year 2004. Since the onset of the global financial crisis, the fiscal positions have
further deteriorated significantly and accentuated the sovereign risk level.
4. What explains debt managers’ behavior?
In this section, we try to understand the determinants of debt managers’ behavior and
build some testable hypothesis. We also document the additional drivers whose relevance
will vary during different phases. As per the norm, at the start of the year, debt manages
get an estimate of debt financing requirement by the government. Once this information is
available, the following decisions need to be made: (1) the maturity composition of debt;
and (2) the timing of debt issuance. The economic question we want to raise here is how
these decisions are influenced by the yield curve. We closely follow Hoogduin et al. (2010)
and try to build debt managers reaction function along similar lines. With our dependent
variable - short-term financing relative to long-term financing (RSL)
10 - we aim to capture
the core policy decision of debt managers, namely deciding on the maturity. This ratio is
also relevant for the extent to which debt management interacts with central bank policy
decisions related with financial stability and monetary policy.
4.1. Data visualization
A preliminary look at the data provides some suggestive evidence of the role of yield
curve in debt managers’ reaction function. Figure 2 plots RSL (ratio of short to long-term
debt) with the money market rate (short-term interest rate). As can be seen, during the
first phase, the ratio of short-term debt increases in general when the policy rate goes down,
suggesting more short-term debt issuance. However in the second phase, the average share of
short-term debt becomes extremely high. After joining the Economic Adjustment Program,
this trend breaks but once Portugal started getting market access, it restores the trend.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 plots RSL with 10-year benchmark Portuguese sovereign bond yield. In general,
the share of short-term debt increases even when the long-term interest rates falls (movement
in opposite direction). This is counterintuitive as fall in long-term interest rate should help
debt managers raise long-term debt comfortably. To help understand this, we plot term
premia with RSL in Figure 4. When the term premium is low, we observe lower RSL
suggesting long-term debt issuance compare to short-term which translates to lower RSL
(movement in similar direction).
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
10The detailed variable construction methodology is explained in section 5.
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4.2. Hypothesis on the behavior of public debt managers
The variable of interest, our dependent variable is the ratio of short-term to long-term
debt (RSL). We expect this ratio to be driven by the following variables:
1. Net financing need: As debt managers ensure that the financing needs of the govern-
ment are met, the primary fiscal deficit will play an important role. Assuming the
predictability of debt issuance vital for debt market, higher financing needs will make
debt managers shift the portfolio towards long-term maturities given the expected
increase in long-term interest rate;
2. Current debt level: Higher outstanding sovereign debt amounts could imply that a
lower fraction should be financed in the money market in order to limit exposure to
interest rate shocks, forcing the debt managers towards the longer maturity;
3. A benchmark debt composition: For wholesale development of short and long-term
debt market, we expect debt managers to always finance at least a minimum fixed
amount of their financing needs in the money market;
4. Cost factors: Cost considerations will be reflected by the current and expected levels
of short-term and long-term interest rates. A higher short-term interest rate implies
more expensive money market financing and may decrease the share of short-term
financing. However higher expected short-term rate will increase the share of short-
term financing;
5. Risk factors: Current market volatility and term premia relative to the historical aver-
age will reflect the risk considerations. During periods of heightened volatility, it might
be more difficult to issue long-term bonds. Likewise, in an inflationary environment,
investors might opt for short-term positions, leading to a positive effect;
6. Liquidity: Size and credit quality, relative to the size and credit quality of the European
debt market matters for higher liquidity. Higher liquidity will help tap long-term
investors making it easier to raise long-term debt.
As can be seen (Figures 2-4), the RSL responds in the expected direction for short-term
interest rates and term premia but not to the long-term interest rate. We also see some
sudden reversal in the direction of movement. The purposes of our empirical analysis is
thus to explain these movements over time and to test whether the drivers remain the same
throughout the sample period.
5. Data and empirical methodology
5.1. Data
Dependent variable: Our dependent variable is the ratio of outstanding short-term to
long-term government debt. This data is not available at monthly frequency. So to calculate
the debt stock at monthly frequency, we use two separate dataset: (1) Dataset 1: General
government short and long-term gross debt variable which is available at quarterly frequency;
and (2) Dataset 2: Net issues of general government short, long and total debt securities
which is available at monthly frequency. Since Dataset 1 is available starting 31-03-2000,
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we take the general government short and long-term gross debt as on 31-03-2000 as the
debt stock. The monthly debt stock variable is then computed by subtracting/adding (for
period pre/post 31-03-2000) monthly net debt issues (Dataset 2 ) from the debt stock. To
cross check the computed values, we compare our monthly data with the net stock of debt
outstanding every quarter end and find numbers very close to figures available in Dataset 1.
Explanatory variables: The set of explanatory variables focuses on six types of variables:
(i) The short-term interest rate which is proxied by the money market rate (EONIA); (ii) The
long-term interest rate is proxied by 10-year benchmark Portuguese sovereign bond yield;
(iii) The current period uncertainty is proxied by the annualized 10-year sovereign bond
market volatility; (iv) Sovereign fiscal position is proxied by the general government debt-
to-GDP and net borrowing to GDP ratio; (v) The size of the Portuguese government debt
market relative to the European debt market and foreign holding of Portuguese government
debt is used as proxies for the liquidity concerns. A detailed list of variables, the data
source, measurement unit and frequency is summarized in Table 1 while Table 2 provides
the summary statistics.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
5.2. Econometric specification
We take as a starting point in our analysis the empirical specification suggested by
Hoogduin et al. (2010) and estimate the following debt management reaction function using
OLS for the Portuguese economy:
∆RSLt = c+ α1 EONIAt−1 + α2 Term Spreadt−1 + α3 V olatilityt−1 + α5 (Debt/GDP )t−1




where, subscript t stands for time; EONIA: Month-end Euro Overnight Index Average;
Term spread: Month end term spread (difference between 10 year benchmark Portuguese
bond yield and EONIA); V olatility: Monthly historical annualized volatility based on 10Y
benchmark sovereign bond yields; Debt/GDP : Debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of last quarter;
Primary deficit: Difference between the general government expenditure and revenue as
percentage of GDP at the end of each quarter; Relative size: Portuguese bond market
size relative to the Eurozone debt market; and Foreign holding: Non-resident holding of
Portuguese sovereign debt. Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the variables.11
Moreover, the effects of special events that possibly influence financing decisions are
captured by dummies. Finally, we expect a statistically significant coefficient for the lagged
dependent variable since a high outstanding short-term debt by the end of a period implies
that a large fraction of it will have to be refinanced in the following period.
11Our dependent variable exhibits non-stationary behavior and hence we use first difference (∆RSL). The
non-stationarity results are not shown here but is available upon request.
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Our analysis differs from other studies as our focus is on the maturity structure of
government debt held outside the central bank, which can be affected by the operation of
both the central bank and the fiscal agency. The aim is to estimate debt amangers reaction
function in normal times during the calm period and before the ECB started intervening
massively. The estimation period therefore only covers the pre-crisis period during which the
central bank was not seeking to influence the term premia directly. These estimates should
not be contaminated by the special effects of recent central bank intervention, regulatory
changes and safe-haven flows on long-term interest rates.
6. Results
Table 3 shows the raw correlation between the explanatory variables with RSL. Short-
term interest rate is strongly and negatively correlated with RSL which is in line with the
expected behavior of debt managers. The term spread and market volatility is positively
correlated which suggest higher short term debt issuance when risk and uncertainty is high.
The sovereigns fiscal positions are also positively correlated with RSL suggesting higher
issuance of debt increases the share of short-term debt. Relative debt market size and
foreign holding of debt is very strongly and positively correlated with RSL suggesting the
role of safe heaven flows during turbulent times.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 4 shows the baseline OLS estimates using Equation (1). An important assumption
in the our statistical analysis is the Portuguese sovereign yield were exogenous to the debt
managers behavior during this period. This assumption implies that short-term and long-
term interest rates were not influenced by the issuances of short or long-term debt, i.e.,
the Portuguese debt managers took interest rates as given and were able to influence only
the maturity composition. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption as during this
period, the Euro area sovereign debt market yield were completely in line with the German
government yield and were driven primarily by the world market conditions.
The conditional correlations shows a very different picture than what we observe with raw
correlations. The sign of the intercept coefficient is negative and statistical insignificance.
This is a bit puzzling as it suggests that debt managers do not target a benchmark debt
composition where a certain proportion of debt is always raised in the short-term debt
market. One possible reason for this may be the strong focus of Portuguese debt managers
to establish long-term debt market in Portuguese benchmark bonds (10-years). As the debt
market of Portuguese bond is relatively small in the European context, it may be more
advantageous for debt managers to issue bonds in higher denominations.
[Table 4 about here.]
Also during calm period, the RSL is strongly and positively influenced by the short-term
money market rate. This is counterintuitive as this suggests issuance of more short-term
debt when short-term rates go up. We find the effect of term premia insignificant while
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market volatility is significantly and positively correlated with RSL. The share of short term
financing, apart from a relevant stickiness effect of the lagged endogenous variable, increases
with an increase in government indebtedness. This debt effect can imply that higher level
of government debt ratio decreases the average debt maturity, i.e. debt managers find it
difficult to raise the outstanding debt duration when government indebtedness is high. We
also find negative and significant effect of primary deficit on RSL.
The effect of liquidity variables are extremely pronounced and significant. The Por-
tuguese debt market size relative to Eurozone debt market negatively influence RSL sug-
gesting the competitiveness and difficulties associated with the issuance of high amount of
debt. The effect of foreign debt holding is positive suggesting risk averse behavior of foreign
debt holders towards long term Portuguese sovereign debt. Moreover, we would indeed ex-
pect a statistically significant negative coefficient for the lagged dependent variable since a
high outstanding short term debt by the period implies that the debt managers would need
to rebalance the portfolio in the following period.
6.1. Crisis period
When we estimate the full sample and crisis period to contract this with the pre-crisis
period (first and the last column in Table 4), we see that most variables loose their significant.
The debt ratio becomes irrelevant in the crisis period as a determinant of the relative size of
the short-term financing. Moreover, even the statistically significant coefficient for the lagged
dependent variable becomes insignificant suggesting the role of other exogenous variables in
determining the share of short-term debt.
On the other hand foreign debt holding of sovereign debt pushes up the share of short-
term debt in the pre-crisis and in the full time period. For the full period, show that the
share of short term financing, apart from a relevant stickiness effect of the lagged endogenous
variable, decreases with an increase in government indebtedness. This debt effect can imply
that the higher the level of government debt ratio the more the authorities wish to increase
the average maturity (and the duration) of the stock of sovereign debt liabilities. A similar
result emerges for the primary deficit ratio.
In addition, the relative market size seems to be detrimental to the share of short-
term debt, what can be explained by the fact the smaller sovereign debt markets may lack
higher degrees of liquidity. Nevertheless, after the last quarter of 2008, in the crisis period,
this determinant is not statistically relevant, as is in fact the case for all other tentative
determinants. Interestingly, in the crisis period, higher volatility in the sovereign market
10-year yield increased the relative size of short-term debt, hinting to the fact that capital
markets have shied away from long-term debt issuances by Portugal, and also that during the
adjustment program the sovereign financing was relying of the IMF/EC financial support.
In Table 5 we report a set of results with interaction terms for the crisis. In this context
we see that volatility and relative market size respectively decrease and increase short-
term financing relative to long-term financing. In addition, the term-spread, the difference
between the 10-year sovereign yield for Portugal and EONIA, is positively determining the
relative size of short-term debt.
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[Table 5 about here.]
In order to assess and take into account the possibility of endogeneity we report in Table
6 the estimation results for a baseline specification using 2SLS. The conclusions hold as we
can see when comparing with the results from Tables 4 and 5. In practice the fiscal and the
foreign debt ownership determinants are still paramount as is the case of the term-spread
for the dummy-crisis version of the estimation.
[Table 6 about here.]
6.2. Robustness checks
Firstly, the results are robust to different measures of short-term (EURIBOR or 3-month
treasury yield or Marginal lending rate) and long-term interest rate (2-year, 5-year or 10-year
Portuguese sovereign yield). Secondly, we made an exercise of robustness and checked to
what extent economic fundamentals play a role, notably publicly available macroeconomic
forecasts from the European Commission, published in the Spring and in the Autumn.
We use a different econometric setup to gain some intuition on the role that debt man-
agers’ can play. We assume that the debt managers are forward looking and their behavior
response to changes in macroeconomic environment. To estimate this model specification,
we expand the set of explanatory variable focusing on three types of variables noted below:
(i) the expected macroeconomic conditions; (ii) expected sovereigns fiscal position; and (iii)
the uncertainty about the economic fundamentals. In particular, the following variables are
included to capture the expected macroeconomic and fiscal state: GDP growth forecast;
expected inflation; expected unemployment rate; expected Debt-to-GDP ratio. All vari-
ables are calculated as the average of the forward two year forecast available from European
Commissions website.12
More precisely, we try to estimate the following specification:
∆RSLt = c+ α1 EONIAt−1 + α2 Term Spreadt−1 + α3 V olatilityt−1 + α4 Primary Deficitt−1
+α7 Relativesizet−1 + α9 Foreign holdingt−1 + δ R
SL
t−1 + β1 Et{GDPGRt+s}
+β2 Et{UNEMPt+s}+ β3 Et{INFt+s}+ β4 Et{DEBTGDPt+s}+ εt
(2)
where, GDPGRt+s is the year end expected future growth rate; UNEMPt+s is the year end
expected unemployment rate; INFt+s is the expected yearly inflation and DEBTGDPt+s is
the expected year end gross debt. We estimate the model on monthly data over the entire
sample period.13
12DG ECFIN produces these economic forecasts on behalf of the European Commission and are published
in the spring and autumn.
13An alternative specification is also tried to capture the uncertainty regarding economic fundamentals: (i)
Economic sentiment indicator (ESI); (ii) Industrial confidence indicator (ICI); and (iii) Consumer confidence
indicator. All these indices are built and maintained by EC and the seasonally adjusted data is available at
monthly frequency. Our regression estimates suggest similar findings. The results are not included here to
save the space but is available upon request.
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Although the results in Tables 7 and 8 do not provide additional statistically significant
insights for such potential determinants, the forecasts for the debt ratio show up as important
in one instance (Table 8), and in line with the previous results for the debt ratio itself. A
similar conclusion is possible for the forecasted debt ratio using a 2SLS approach (Table 9).
Therefore, higher expected debt ratios, via the EC forecasts, the lower would be the share
of short-term debt.
[Table 7 about here.]
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have assessed the assumption that the treasury supply of long-term
debt is independent of the term premium for a small open economy in a currency union over
the period 2000M3 to 2015M10, via the determinants of short-term financing relative to
long-term financing. Empirical estimations indicate that the maturity composition of debt
does not respond to the level of interest rate or to the term premia. These findings give
support to the claims made by recent papers that the effect of large scale asset purchase
program of sovereign debt securites are somewhat conservative (see Gagnon et al. (2011),
Eser and Schwaab (2012), Altavilla et al. (2014), Ghysels et al. (2014), Fratzschser et al.
(2014)).
Our result also suggest that volatility and relative market size respectively decrease
and increase short-term financing relative to long-term financing, while it decreases with
an increase in government indebtedness - suggesting debt managers adherence to the cost
minimization mandate during calm periods. The significant influence of relative debt market
size and cross-border holding of public debt during calm as well as crisis period suggest
liquidity concerns as the major factor determining the evolution of maturity composition
over time.
Moreover, in the crisis period, more volatile Portuguese sovereign 10-year yields increased
the relative supply of short-term debt, with investors not wishing the respective long-term
debt. Increasing the supply of short-term debt increased the interaction between public debt
management and monetary policy. Excessive issuance of debt signaled deteriorating public
finances while excessive short-term debt issuance increased the refinancing risk. As the bad
market conditions persisted, this translated into loss of market access. In practice, during
the adjustment program sovereign financing was essentially done with IMF/EC financial
support and some short-term Treasury Bills issuance.
Regarding policy implications it would be advisable to issue more long term debt when
the market conditions are favorable to create a relevant stock of sovereign fund, which can be
used when the market tightens. In the crisis scenario where central bank directly purchases
government bonds in the secondary market as part of the unconventional monetary policies,
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Figure 1: Portuguese general government statistics
Source: Eurostat; REUTERS. The horizontal lines in Figure (a) represents SGP limits.
















































(a) Debt and budget deficit ratios (Data frequency: Annual)





















(b) 10Y sovereign yield (Data frequency: Daily)
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Figure 2: RSL vs Money market rate (EONIA)
Source: Bank of Portugal; Frequency: Monthly; Author’s calculation. Note: The horizontal line represents
the average level of money market rate (brown) and RSL (blue). The vertical red lines from the left
represents date at which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the official date when Portugal lost market
access and the return of Portugal to international debt market.














































Figure 3: RSL vs 10-year benchmark Portuguese sovereign bond yield
Source: Bank of Portugal; Frequency: Monthly; Author’s calculation. Note: The horizontal line represents
the average level of money market rate (brown) and RSL (blue). The vertical red lines from the left
represents date at which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the official date when Portugal lost market
access and the return of Portugal to international debt market.




















































Figure 4: Ratio of short and long-term debt outstanding (RSL) vs Term premium
Source: Bank of Portugal; Frequency: Monthly; Author’s calculation. Note: The horizontal line represents
the average level of money market rate (brown) and RSL (blue). The vertical red lines from the left
represents date at which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the official date when Portugal lost market
access and the return of Portugal to international debt market.










































Table 1: Data description
Note: GG - General Government; STD - Short-term debt; LTD - Long-term debt; BoP - Banco de Portugal;
EC - EC; INE - Instituto Nacional de Estat́ıstica; DGO - Direcção Geral do Orçamento.
Time series name Source Power Unit of measure Frequency
EONIA BoP Percent Daily
Treasury bond yield - 10Y BoP Percent Monthly
Net issues of GG STD securities BoP 106 Euros Monthly
Net issues of GG LTD securities BoP 106 Euros Monthly
Gross debt of GG - % of GDP DGO and BoP Percentage Quarterly
GG gross debt - short-term BoP 106 Euros Quarterly
GG gross debt - long-term BoP 106 Euros Quarterly
GG Net lending (-) /net borrowing (+) EuroStat Percentage Quarterly
GG Net expenditure (+) /net revenue (-) EuroStat Percentage Quarterly
Non-resident holding of GG debt BoP Percentage Quarterly
Relative debt market size EuroStat Percentage Monthly
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
RSL 0.22 7.92 12.50 11.31 16.46 20.58
EONIA -0.12 0.35 2.06 1.98 3.33 5.06
Term Spread 0.15 1.21 2.08 3.27 4.38 13.47
V olatility 6.04 11.42 15.89 21.16 26.99 109.40
Debt/GDP ratio 50.10 58.70 68.85 82.09 111.40 132.80
Primary Deficit -0.20 2.70 5.65 5.62 7.40 18.50
Relative Market Size 1.37 1.56 1.80 1.76 1.92 2.16
Foreign Debt Holding 37.61 57.23 64.97 62.96 70.97 79.70
21
Table 3: Raw correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) RSL 1.00
(2) EONIA -0.53 1.00
(3) Term Spread 0.33 -0.70 1.00
(4) V olatility 0.29 -0.60 0.49 1.00
(5) Debt/GDP ratio 0.36 -0.83 0.69 0.63 1.00
(6) Primary Deficit 0.40 -0.45 0.33 0.25 0.26 1.00
(7) Relative Market Size 0.80 -0.55 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.42 1.00
(8) Foreign Debt Holding 0.64 -0.41 -0.15 0.22 0.33 0.18 0.55 1.00
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Table 4: Baseline estimates for different periods
Dependent Variable ∆RSLt
Full sample Pre-crisis period Crisis Period
Constant 1.1407 -2.6448 2.9096
(0.3569) (0.4027) (0.8012)
EONIA(t−1) 0.0369 0.9088** 0.0794
(0.8160) (0.0214) (0.8060)
Term Spread(t−1) 0.1361 0.5357 0.0434
(0.1073) (0.1974) (0.8007)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0062 0.1058*** -0.0004
(0.4656) (0.0023) (0.9638)
Debt/GDP ratio(t−1) -0.0124* 0.2857** -0.0096
(0.0696) (0.0359) (0.5586)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0288 -0.0858* -0.0150
(0.3677) (0.0670) (0.7484)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.0205** -15.6540*** -1.7570
(0.0215) (0.0014) (0.5354)
Foreign Debt Holding(t−1) 0.0477** 0.1106*** 0.0191
(0.0209) (0.0059) (0.7861)
∆RSL(t−1) -0.2993*** -0.4716*** -0.1360
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2479)
R-squared 0.1324 0.3739 0.0538
Adjusted R2 0.0925 0.3195 -0.0498
Durbin-Watson 1.8806 1.8711 1.9669
No. of observations 183 101 82
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Baseline regression with interaction terms
Dependent Variable ∆RSLt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 1.5125 1.7051 0.627 0.2442 1.7016 1.77 1.9791 2.8819* -2.4874
(0.2362) (0.1989) (0.7652) (0.8568) (0.2383) (0.173) (0.1288) (0.0691) (0.4798)
EONIA(t−1) 0.1017 0.046 0.1738 0.1618 0.1159 0.1035 0.3106 0.0662 0.8500*
(0.5437) (0.8141) (0.4208) (0.3321) (0.5081) (0.5361) (0.1376) (0.6947) (0.0516)
Term Spread(t−1) 0.1420* 0.1294 0.3116 0.112 0.1553 0.1559* 0.2180** -0.0052 0.4622
(0.0931) (0.14) (0.3456) (0.1824) (0.1089) (0.0684) (0.0234) (0.9681) (0.3168)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0047 0.0047 0.0046 0.0916*** 0.0042 0.0051 0.0019 0.0058 0.1033***
(0.5821) (0.5851) (0.5886) (0.0109) (0.6304) (0.5477) (0.8225) (0.4979) (0.0069)
Debt/GDP(t−1) -0.0162** -0.0137 -0.0137 -0.0128* -0.0395 -0.0157** -0.0002 -0.0209** 0.2753*
(0.032) (0.1202) (0.1258) (0.0909) (0.6302) (0.0386) (0.9868) (0.011) (0.0678)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0347 -0.0346 -0.0325 -0.0415 -0.0364 -0.0748 -0.0451 -0.0358 -0.084
(0.2832) (0.2853) (0.3197) (0.194) (0.2694) (0.1283) (0.1689) (0.2667) (0.1061)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.4310** -2.3812** -2.2701** -2.1908** -1.9962 -2.6923*** -5.4089*** -3.7939*** -14.8591***
(0.0102) (0.0124) (0.0224) (0.0192) (0.2662) (0.0059) (0.008) (0.0045) (0.0055)
Foreign Debt Holding(t−1) 0.0530** 0.0491** 0.0533** 0.0438** 0.0605* 0.0576*** 0.0986*** 0.0767*** 0.1016***
(0.0122) (0.0274) (0.0119) (0.0378) (0.0735) (0.0076) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0213)
DUMMY Crisis
(t−1) 0.549 0.2684 0.8096 1.9479*** -1.2452 0.1143 -10.8051 7.243 6.544






























(t−1) -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.1394 0.141 0.1409 0.1699 0.1399 0.1453 0.1531 0.1501 0.2114
Adjusted R2 0.0947 0.091 0.0909 0.1217 0.0898 0.0956 0.1039 0.1006 0.1354
Durbin-Watson 1.8804 1.8797 1.8794 1.8694 1.8802 1.8803 1.8792 1.8974 1.8975
No. of observations 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Term Spread(t−1) 0.1830 0.1879*
(0.1017) (0.0918)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0191 0.0167
(0.4228) (0.4906)
Debt/GDP ratio(t−1) -0.0193** -0.0242**
(0.0643) (0.0303)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0540 -0.0637
(0.4175) (0.3481)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.6623** -3.1258**
(0.0301) (0.0169)







Adjusted R2 -0.145 -0.1338
No. of observations 182 182
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Baseline estimates for forward looking debt managers for different periods





Full sample Pre-crisis period Crisis Period
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 1.1407 1.2985 1.4204 -1.1038 0.2108 -6.6907 0.2108
(0.3569) (0.3221) (0.4107) (0.7896) (0.9729) (0.5663) (0.9729)
EONIA(t−1) 0.0369 0.0330 0.0376 0.7006 0.6572 0.3301 0.6572
(0.8160) (0.8413) (0.8377) (0.1425) (0.1769) (0.3615) (0.1769)
Term Spread(t−1) 0.1361 0.1280 0.0532 0.4761 0.4039 0.1274 0.4039
(0.1073) (0.1297) (0.6270) (0.3219) (0.4178) (0.4491) (0.4178)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0062 0.0049 0.0049 0.0945*** 0.0864** -0.0029 0.0864**
(0.4656) (0.5582) (0.5720) (0.0084) (0.0228) (0.7608) (0.0228)
Debt/GDP(t−1) -0.0124*
(0.0696)
EXP (Debt/GDP ratio) -0.0118 0.0054 0.0410 0.0207 0.0079 0.0207
(0.1333) (0.7701) (0.5199) (0.7692) (0.6856) (0.7692)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0288 -0.0279 -0.0340 -0.1000** -0.0810 -0.0136 -0.0810
(0.3677) (0.3884) (0.3148) (0.0351) (0.1102) (0.7736) (0.1102)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.0205** -2.0123** -2.3367** -7.7941*** -8.4327*** 0.3988 -8.4327***
(0.0215) (0.0224) (0.0119) (0.0081) (0.0055) (0.8851) (0.0055)
Foreign Debt Holding(t−1) 0.0477** 0.0451** 0.0434** 0.1309*** 0.1119** 0.0647 0.1119**
(0.0209) (0.0284) (0.0421) (0.0033) (0.0234) (0.3552) (0.0234)
EXP (GDP growth rate) -0.2094 0.1168 0.1168
(0.1726) (0.7714) (0.7714)
EXP (Unemployment rate) -0.0754 0.3423 0.3423
(0.4855) (0.2555) (0.2555)
EXP (Inflation) 0.1737 -0.0205 -0.0205
(0.5433) (0.9786) (0.9786)
∆RSL(t−1) -0.2993*** -0.2989*** -0.3018*** -0.4603*** -0.4664*** -0.1321 -0.4664***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2617) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.1324 0.1272 0.1385 0.346 0.3558 0.0515 0.3558
Adjusted 0.0925 0.0871 0.083 0.2891 0.2762 -0.0524 0.2762
Durbin-Watson 1.8806 1.8839 1.8717 1.819 1.8299 1.9439 1.8299
No. of observations 183 183 183 101 101 82 101
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
26
Table 8: Forward looking debt managers behavior with interactive terms
Dependent Variable ∆RSLt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.5125 1.7052 1.9655 1.3916 2.2507 2.9687
(0.2362) (0.2139) (0.3456) (0.4209) (0.2377) (0.3446)
EONIA(t−1) 0.1017 0.0821 0.0656 0.0337 0.0319 0.0208
(0.5437) (0.6325) (0.7345) (0.8548) (0.8623) (0.9191)
Term Spread(t−1) 0.1420* 0.1325 0.0583 0.0464 0.0246 0.0018
(0.0931) (0.1173) (0.5972) (0.6729) (0.8277) (0.9887)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0047 0.0034 0.0042 0.0038 0.0038 0.0044
(0.5821) (0.6854) (0.6288) (0.6642) (0.6620) (0.6178)
Debt/GDP(t−1) -0.0162**
(0.0320)
EXP (Debt/GDP ratio) -0.0156* 0.0033 0.0012 0.0007 0.0022
(0.0736) (0.8629) (0.9483) (0.9721) (0.9074)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0347 -0.0334 -0.0352 -0.0355 -0.0341 -0.0317
(0.2832) (0.3082) (0.2997) (0.2953) (0.3121) (0.3550)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.4310** -2.3618** -2.4274** -2.4864*** -2.8193*** -3.0877**
(0.0102) (0.0127) (0.0107) (0.0090) (0.0069) (0.0103)
Foreign Debt Holding(t−1) 0.0530** 0.0491** 0.0411* 0.0490** 0.0459** 0.0417
(0.0122) (0.0192) (0.0614) (0.0304) (0.0327) (0.1425)
EXP (GDP growth rate) 0.549 0.4727 -0.3072 -0.1870 -0.1976 -0.1797
(0.2364) (0.3083) (0.2355) (0.2319) (0.1992) (0.6128)
EXP (Unemployment rate) -0.0726 -0.0982 -0.0482 0.0116
(0.5038) (0.3823) (0.6646) (0.9484)
EXP (Inflation) 0.1505 0.3021 0.148 -0.0511
(0.6046) (0.3634) (0.6060) (0.9321)
EXP (GDP growth rate) ∗DummyCrisis 0.1335 -0.0502
(0.6383) (0.8990)
EXP (Unemployment rate) ∗DummyCrisis 0.0466 -0.0655
(0.4466) (0.6875)
EXP (Inflation) ∗DummyCrisis 0.2408 0.4967
(0.3019) (0.4003)
∆RSL(t−1) -0.3015*** -0.3011*** -0.3021*** -0.3048*** -0.3057*** -0.3057***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.1394 0.1325 0.1396 0.1414 0.1439 0.1450
Adjusted R2 0.0947 0.0873 0.0788 0.0808 0.0834 0.0738
Durbin-Watson 1.8804 1.8849 1.8747 1.8758 1.8792 1.8802
No. of observations 183 183 183 183 183 183
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Term Spread(t−1) 0.1704 0.1729
(0.1238) (0.1172)
V olatility(t−1) 0.0142 0.0111
(0.5294) (0.6364)
EXP (Debt/GDP ratio) -0.0192* -0.0241**
(0.0867) (0.0428)
Primary Deficit(t−1) -0.0527 -0.0621
(0.4297) (0.3608)
Relative Market Size(t−1) -2.6212** -3.0320**
(0.0335) (0.0204)







Adjusted R2 -0.1538 -0.1448
No. of observations 182 182
Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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